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STATE V. RUDY B.:
DENYING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS THE
BENEFIT OF APPRENDI’S BRIGHT-LINE
RULE BEFORE ADULT SENTENCING
Amanda L. Thatcher*

I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Rudy B., the New Mexico Supreme Court determined
that youthful offenders are not entitled to a jury finding for amenability
determinations.1 Amenability determinations are used in New Mexico to
“gauge the possibility for meaningful rehabilitation”2 of a child who has
been adjudicated as a youthful offender3 and to determine whether that
child will be sentenced as a juvenile or as an adult.4 The trial court is
required to find that a child is not amenable to rehabilitative treatment or
eligible for commitment to an institution for developmentally disabled
children before invoking its discretion to sentence a child as an adult.5
There is a great disparity between the maximum sentences that a youthful
offender can receive depending on whether he or she is sentenced as a
juvenile or an adult. Sentenced as a juvenile, the maximum sentence a
youthful offender can receive is commitment in a juvenile facility until
the age of twenty-one.6 Sentenced as an adult, the maximum sentence a
youthful offender can receive is imprisonment in an adult penitentiary for
the maximum sentence that would be applicable to an adult convicted of
the same offense or offenses.7 In effect, an adult sentence could potentially expose a child to life imprisonment.
* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2013. The author thanks
Tim Thatcher for his endless support and encouragement. The author also thanks
Dean Kevin K. Washburn and Professor Michael B. Browde for their invaluable
advice and assistance.
1. State v. Rudy B. (Rudy II), 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 2, 234 P.3d 726, 727, cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2098 (2011).
2. State v. Gonzales (Gonzales I), 2001-NMCA-025, ¶ 19, 24 P.3d 776, 783.
3. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(J) (2009). A youthful offender is a child adjudicated
for any one or more of thirteen offenses that were committed when the child was
between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.
4. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20 (2009).
5. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(B).
6. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-19(B) (2009).
7. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(E).
317
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Amenability determinations in New Mexico are similar to proceedings in other states that determine whether a delinquent child will be subject to a juvenile adjudication with status as a child, or whether the child
will receive a criminal conviction with status as an adult.8 The proceedings
for youthful offenders in New Mexico, however, are unique because they
occur after trial,9 whereas the proceedings in other states occur as a preliminary matter before trial.10 The practical effect then, is that other
states’ proceedings merely determine whether the adult court or juvenile
court will have jurisdiction over a child, while in New Mexico, the proceedings have a direct impact on the length of the sentence received by a
youthful offender.
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, a
landmark case that limited a judge’s ability to enhance a criminal sentence based on certain factors. Apprendi provided the bright-line rule
that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”11 Although
the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that the trial court
could impose without any additional findings,12 the New Mexico Supreme
Court concluded that applying Apprendi’s bright-line rule to findings of
non-amenability would be an improper extension of the rule.13 The New
Mexico Supreme Court came to this conclusion after reviewing the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Ice, in which the Supreme Court
held that in light of historical practice and state sovereignty, Apprendi did
not require a jury to make the factual findings necessary for a judge to
impose consecutive sentences.14
The refusal to apply the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations is significant in New Mexico because it puts a youthful offender at
risk of being imprisoned, conceivably for life, without affording the child
basic constitutional protections. This note will examine the rationale behind the New Mexico Supreme Court’s refusal to apply the Apprendi rule
to amenability determinations and provide an analysis of the court’s
decision.

8. INST. OF PUB. LAW, UNIV. OF N.M. SCH. OF LAW, NEW MEXICO JUVENILE
JUSTICE HANDBOOK 1-7 (2011).
9. Id.
10. 2 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 513–15 (2d ed. 1994).
11. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
12. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004).
13. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 59, 234 P.3d 726, 740, cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2098
(2011).
14. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 164 (2009).
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Part II examines the applicable law that served as the backdrop for
the decision in Rudy B. It begins with a discussion of the juvenile justice
system generally and then reviews the juvenile justice system and its history in New Mexico. Next, it reviews the Apprendi decision in detail and
then reviews the decision in Oregon v. Ice.15 Part II concludes with an
examination of State v. Gonzales,16 the first New Mexico case to determine whether the Apprendi rule applied to amenability determinations,
and Gonzales v. Tafoya,17 the subsequent federal habeas case that addressed whether the Apprendi rule applied to amenability
determinations.
Part III examines Rudy B. in detail, reviewing its procedural history
at the trial court, the court of appeals, the supreme court, and on remand.
In Rudy B., the trial court found the child was not amenable to treatment
and sentenced him to twenty-five years in an adult penitentiary. The
court of appeals held that the Apprendi rule should be applied to amenability determinations, a decision that was reversed by the supreme court.
On remand, the original adult sentence was affirmed. Part III focuses
most heavily on the decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court, providing a detailed review of the court’s holding and rationale, as well as the
dissent’s view of the case.
Part IV provides an analysis of Rudy B. Part IV first reviews historical practice and state sovereignty considerations of applying the Apprendi
rule to amenability determinations. It then reviews the New Mexico Supreme Court’s reliance on Ice in its application of the Apprendi rule to
Rudy B. Part IV concludes with an analysis of the importance of the jury
system and the jury’s role in the juvenile justice system.
Part V concludes the note, offering suggestions as to how New Mexico should proceed following the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision
in Rudy B.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Juvenile Justice System
At common law, juvenile offenders were treated just like adults in
the criminal justice system.18 The exception was if they were deemed incapable of forming the requisite criminal intent.19 The ability to form the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

555 U.S. 160.
Gonzales I, 2001-NMCA-025, 24 P.3d 776.
Gonzales v. Tafoya (Gonzales II), 515 F.3d 1097 (2008).
2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 363.
Id.

R
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requisite criminal intent largely depended on a child’s age: children
younger than seven were presumed incapable of forming the requisite
mental intent; children between seven and fourteen were entitled to a
rebuttable presumption that they lacked the requisite mental intent; children older than fourteen were presumed to have the requisite mental intent and were thus treated like adults under the law.20 This approach
continued until 1899, when Illinois created the first separate juvenile
court.21 Today, all states have a separate juvenile justice system.22
Social changes of the late nineteenth century brought with them the
desire to prevent children from being imprisoned with hardened adult
criminals.23 Children were to be rehabilitated through procedures that
were “‘clinical’ rather than punitive.”24 These procedures were not adversarial because the state was proceeding as parens patriae.25 This term,
originally taken from chancery practice, described the power of the state
to act on behalf of a child to protect the property interests and person of
the child.26 Most states, including New Mexico, expressed the purpose of
their juvenile justice systems to be the rehabilitation, rather than the punishment, of children.27 The underlying policy of a separate juvenile justice
system was to remove children from the adult system and provide them
with “rehabilitation through individualized justice.”28
Juvenile courts did not exist at common law and were created by
statutes.29 The statutory definitions of a juvenile and the requirements for
administration of the juvenile court systems vary by jurisdiction, but the
general policy behind the juvenile system—to remove juveniles from the
adult system—is shared by all jurisdictions.30 By treating juveniles separately, the hope was that they would not be stigmatized as criminals at
such a young age.31

20. Id.
21. Id. at 364.
22. Id. at 367.
23. Id. at 364.
24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967).
25. Id. at 16. A state acting as parens patriae proceeds as a parent of a child. INST.
OF PUB. LAW, supra note 8, at 1-4.
26. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
27. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 364; see NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-2 (2007).
28. Kelly K. Waterfall, Note, State v. Muniz: Authorizing Adult Sentencing of
Juveniles Absent a Conviction That Authorizes an Adult Sentence, 35 N.M. L. REV.
229, 230 (2005) (quotation marks in original) (citation omitted).
29. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 364.
30. Id. at 364–65.
31. Id. at 365; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (stating
that state legislatures have chosen not to label juvenile offenders as criminals).

R
R
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Between 1899 and 1966, the juvenile justice system operated much
like social welfare agencies with the goal to rehabilitate children.32 Juvenile proceedings were categorized as civil proceedings, rather than criminal proceedings, and therefore, a state was not subject to the same
restrictions placed on it in other contexts where liberty interests were at
stake.33 Juvenile proceedings were informal, but because of this informality, children were not afforded general constitutional protections that
were provided to adult offenders.34 The discretion in the juvenile courts
has resulted in arbitrary deprivation of fundamental rights, rather than
compassionate, individualized treatment.35
Beginning in 1966, case law began to expand the constitutional
rights of children.36 Not all constitutional rights have been incorporated to
apply to children; notably, children have no federal constitutional right to
a jury trial in adjudicative proceedings,37 but children do have a right to a
jury trial under the New Mexico Constitution.38
Some children, depending on their characteristics as offenders or
the characteristics of the offenses themselves, are tried in adult court.39
Often called “waiver,”40 because it is a waiver by the juvenile court of
jurisdiction over a child, this procedure is used when a child is determined
not to be amenable to rehabilitative treatment.41 Waiver decisions are

32. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 375.
33. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
34. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 375–76.
35. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18–19 (footnotes omitted).
36. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 376; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30–31 (holding that children are entitled to specific due process requirements in delinquency proceedings: the right to receive notice of proceedings that would be constitutionally
adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding, the right to counsel if confinement is a
possibility, privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561–62 (1966)
(holding that due process and fair treatment entitle a juvenile to a hearing before
proceedings can be waived to an adult court); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369 (1970)
(holding that juveniles are entitled to a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in adjudicative proceedings).
37. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
38. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-16 (2009); see also Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 723,
437 P.2d 716, 722 (1968) (recognizing that a jury trial is required under N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 14).
39. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 511–13.
40. Jurisdictions vary in the use of the term “waiver,” “transfer,” or “certification”
when a child is moved to the adult system. Wayne R. LaFave, et al., 6 Crim. Proc.
§ 26.4(i) (3d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CRIMPROC.
41. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 513–15.
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made in the “best interests of the child and public.”42 When a child is
waived into the adult system, he or she is then afforded all of the constitutional protections of an adult, including the right to a jury trial.43 Juveniles
that are waived into the adult system receive punishment similar to adults
who are charged with the same offense, rather than the rehabilitation
sought in the juvenile system.44
Kent v. United States45 initiated massive legislative reform for waiver
proceedings.46 Not only were the procedural requirements adopted in
many state statutes, but the factors to be considered when making a
waiver decision were also adopted.47 The factors included whether the
offense was against a person or property, whether it was committed in a
vicious or premeditated manner, whether suitable programs were available for rehabilitation of the child, the maturity and the sophistication of
the child, the child’s prior criminal history, and the child’s physical and
mental condition.48 Notably, Kent did not hand down the procedural requirement affording juveniles the right to a jury trial for waiver decisions49 but held that waiver hearings must comply with “the essentials of
due process and fair treatment.”50 The due process standard for juvenile
proceedings is “fundamental fairness.”51
In most jurisdictions, the decision to waive a child into the adult
system is made by a trial court judge.52 Commonly termed “judicial
waiver,” these proceedings usually require a hearing in which the amenability of the child to rehabilitative treatment is considered.53 There are

42. Waterfall, supra note 28, at 230 (quotation marks in original) (citation
omitted).
43. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 516.
44. Id.
45. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
46. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 534.
47. Id. at 535.
48. Id. A modified version of these factors has been adopted in New Mexico for
amenability determinations. See infra Part II.B.
49. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 535.
50. Kent, 383 U.S. at 562.
51. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
52. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 517.
53. Daniel M. Vannella, Note, Let the Jury Do the Waive: How Apprendi v. New
Jersey Applies to Juvenile Transfer Proceedings, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 738
(2006). Amenability determinations normally require a finding of whether the interests of the juvenile and society would be best served by transferring a child to the
adult system.
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some exceptions, however, by the use of automatic waiver provisions54 or
by allowing the prosecutor to make the decision.55 These exceptions became more common beginning in the 1980s because there was an increase
in violent crime committed by juveniles in the United States.56 The juvenile system was reformed to focus more on public welfare, and many juvenile courts began to automatically waive jurisdiction over a child based
on the offense of which he or she was accused without regard to the rehabilitative prospects of the child.57 As a result, the child lost the greater
procedural protections that he or she had in the juvenile system.58
The waiver requirements of the juvenile court are usually articulated
by statute.59 Traditionally, age has been one of the most important requirements when determining whether or not the juvenile court will
waive jurisdiction.60 This is evidenced by many states’ inability to waive
jurisdiction over a child who is under a certain age61 and the use of automatic waiver provisions for a child who is above a certain age.62 The reasoning is that younger children are thought to be more amenable to
rehabilitative treatment.63 Next to age, circumstances surrounding the nature of the offense and a child’s prior criminal or delinquency history are
commonly considered when determining whether or not to waive jurisdiction over a child.64 Some states require mandatory waiver if a child is
charged with a very serious offense, such as murder,65 because serious
offenders are presumed not to be amenable to rehabilitative treatment
and might undermine the rehabilitative efforts of other children if they

54. Commonly termed “legislative waiver” provisions, these provisions typically
allow for children of a certain age or children that have committed certain acts to be
automatically transferred to the adult system. Id. at 741.
55. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 518. Prosecutorial waiver puts the decision in the
hands of one individual, and the prosecutor is generally not required to base the decision on an amenability determination or due process consideration. They are also
controversial because they are prone to political pressure and racial bias. Vannella,
supra note 53, at 743.
56. INST. OF PUB. LAW, supra note 8, at 1-7.
57. INST. OF PUB. LAW, supra note 8, at 1-7.
58. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 520.
59. Id. at 527.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (Deering 2011); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-2-518 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2347 (2006).
62. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 527.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 528–29.
65. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1010 (2011); NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(H)
(2009); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6322 (1995).
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are placed in the juvenile system.66 The majority rule is that a hearing
must be held before making the waiver decision because the decision is
highly dependent on a particularized factual inquiry into a child at a given
time and under given circumstances.67
B. The Juvenile Justice System in New Mexico
The modern juvenile justice system in New Mexico is governed by
the Delinquency Act,68 which is contained in the Children’s Code.69 The
Delinquency Act was designed to shield children from the adult consequences of criminal behavior but also to hold them accountable to the
extent proper depending on their age, education, mental and physical factors, background, and all other factors deemed relevant; to provide a system of supervision, care, and rehabilitation for children; and to deter acts
of juvenile delinquency.70
In New Mexico, children are entitled to a jury trial for delinquency
proceedings if an adult charged with the same offense would be entitled
to a jury trial.71 Additionally, children are statutorily entitled to the same
“basic rights” as adults, except as otherwise provided in the Children’s
Code.72 “Basic rights” has been interpreted to mean basic constitutional
protections, including protections against unreasonable search and
seizure and confrontation rights of the Sixth Amendment.73

66. 2 KRAMER, supra note 10, at 529–30.
67. Id. at 531.
68. Delinquency Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-2-1 to 32A-2-33 (1993, as amended
through 2009).
69. Children’s Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A-1-1 to 32A-24-5 (1993, as amended
through 2009).
70. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-2 (1993, prior to amendments through 2009). This section was later revised in 2003 and 2007 to include nine additional purposes of the act.
71. This right was first recognized as a constitutional right in Peyton v. Nord, 78
N.M. 717, 723, 437 P.2d 716, 722 (1968) (recognizing that a jury trial is required under
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14) and is also codified under NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-16 (2009).
Even after the decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971), the
New Mexico Supreme Court has ruled that juveniles have a constitutional right to a
jury trial in New Mexico. INST. OF PUB. LAW, supra note 8, at 2-9; see State v. Eric M.,
1996-NMSC-056, ¶ 5, 925 P.2d 1198, 1199 (reaffirming that children charged with a
violation of state law are entitled to a jury trial).
72. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14 (2009).
73. INST. OF PUB. LAW, supra note 8, at 2-1; see State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC030, ¶ 32, 33 P.3d 1, 15 (stating basic rights include the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and the right to confront witnesses).
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There are three types of juvenile offenders defined in the Delinquency Act: delinquent offenders,74 youthful offenders,75 and serious
youthful offenders.76 Whether a child is sentenced as an adult or juvenile
depends on the statutory classification of the child.77 The procedural rules
that are applicable to a child’s proceeding also depend on his or her statutory classification.78 A child who has been charged as a youthful offender
will be tried under the Rules of Criminal Procedure that govern adult
proceedings.79 If a child is convicted of a youthful offender offense, he or
she will be sentenced as an adult or juvenile at the trial court’s
discretion.80
New Mexico created its separate juvenile court system in 1917 when
it enacted its first juvenile code.81 Prior to 1917, a juvenile was treated “no
differently than an adult.”82 The first juvenile code did not allow delinquent adjudications to be deemed criminal convictions, and there was no
provision in the code that allowed a juvenile to be prosecuted in the adult
system.83 The juvenile code was amended in 1943 to allow a juvenile to be

74. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(C) (2009). A delinquent offender is a delinquent child
who is neither a youthful offender nor a serious youthful offender.
75. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(J). A youthful offender is a child adjudicated for any
one or more of thirteen offenses that were committed when the child was between the
ages of fourteen and eighteen.
76. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(H). A serious youthful offender is a child between the
ages of fifteen and eighteen charged with and indicted or bound over for first degree
murder.
77. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3. A delinquent offender is only subject to juvenile
sanctions. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(C). A youthful offender is subject to either adult or
juvenile sanctions. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(J). A serious youthful offender is subject
to only an adult sentence because he or she is not a delinquent child as defined by the
Delinquency Act. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(H). If a child originally charged as a serious
youthful offender is adjudicated for an offense other than first degree murder, he or
she will be sentenced “as either a youthful offender or a delinquent offender, depending on the nature of the adjudicated act.” State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 19, 229
P.3d 474, 478–79.
78. Rule 10-101 NMRA. The Children’s Court Rules govern procedures for delinquent offenders. Rule 10-101(A)(1)(a). The Rules of Criminal Procedure govern procedures for both youthful offenders and serious youthful offenders. Rule 10101(A)(2).
79. Rule 10-101(A)(2)(b).
80. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(A) (2009).
81. INST. OF PUB. LAW, supra note 8, at 1-3; see also Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 25,
229 P.3d at 480.
82. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 25, 229 P.3d at 480 (quoting Peyton v. Nord, 78
N.M. 717, 723, 437 P.2d 716, 722 (1968)).
83. Id. ¶ 25, 229 P.3d at 480.

R
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prosecuted in the adult system for the commission of a felony.84 In 1955,
the juvenile code was amended again to limit the class of juveniles who
could be prosecuted in the adult system, requiring that a child be older
than fourteen and not suitable for reformation or rehabilitation to be
treated as an adult.85 The code was changed again in 1972 to require that
a child be at least sixteen years old and charged with a felony to be prosecuted in the adult system.86 Before waiving its jurisdiction over a case to
the adult court, the juvenile court was required to find, among other
things,87 that a child was not amenable to rehabilitative treatment in available facilities.88 The code was amended again three years later to lower
the threshold for waiving a case to adult court, allowing for discretionary
waiver of a child at least fifteen years old accused of murder or sixteen
years old accused of an enumerated felony considered to be a serious
offense.89 Additionally, the juvenile court was no longer required to make
the finding that a child was not amenable to rehabilitative treatment; it
only had to consider amenability when making the waiver decision.90 Finally, in 1993, the state adopted its modern statutory requirements, which
mandate that only serious youthful offenders can be prosecuted in adult
court and “[a]ll others remain in the juvenile system until after adjudication and may be sentenced as adults only after an amenability hearing.”91
Although the code now requires waiver of a child over the age of fourteen charged with first-degree murder, it eliminates the juvenile court’s
ability to waive jurisdiction over other offenders.92
New Mexico follows a unique approach with regard to waiver proceedings in that all children, except for serious youthful offenders,93 are
adjudicated in the juvenile court system.94 Only after adjudication as a
youthful offender is it decided whether a child will then be sentenced as

84. Id. ¶ 26, 229 P.3d at 480.
85. Id. ¶ 27, 229 P.3d at 481.
86. Id. ¶ 29, 229 P.3d at 481.
87. The court was also required to find that there were reasonable grounds to
believe that the child committed the act alleged, that the child was not committable to
an institution for the mentally ill, and that the interests of the community were best
served by restraining or disciplining the child. Id.
88. Id. This waiver procedure was much like the waiver procedures modernly
used in most states. See supra Part II.A.
89. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 30, 229 P.3d at 481.
90. Id. ¶ 30, 229 P.3d at 482.
91. Id. ¶ 31, 229 P.3d at 482.
92. Id. ¶ 32, 229 P.3d at 482.
93. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(H) (2009).
94. INST. OF PUB. LAW, supra note 8, at 1-7.

R
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an adult if the proper findings are made after an amenability hearing.95 To
impose an adult sentence, the trial court is required to make two findings,
one of which is that a child is not amenable to rehabilitative treatment in
available facilities.96 The statute empowers the trial court with the discretion to sentence a child as an adult or juvenile after making the required
findings but then directs the trial court judge as to the specific factors that
he or she must consider when making the findings required to invoke an
adult sentence.97 The trial court judge is required to consider the following eight factors when determining whether a child is amenable to rehabilitative treatment:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense;
(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner;
(3) whether a firearm was used to commit the alleged offense;
(4) whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;
(5) the maturity of the child as determined by consideration of
the child’s home, environmental situation, social and emotional health, pattern of living, brain development, trauma
history and disability;
(6) the record and previous history of the child;
(7) the prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by the use
of procedures, services and facilities currently available; and
(8) any other relevant factor, provided that factor is stated on
the record.98

The Children, Youth, and Families Department is required to submit a predisposition report to the trial court concerning a youthful offender’s amenability to rehabilitative treatment.99 The amenability
determination concerns both the rights of the child and protection of public interest.100 It is an important right for the child, and a child is unable to
95. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20 (2009).
96. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(B). The second finding the trial court must make
before invoking an adult sentence is that “the child is not eligible for commitment to
an institution for children with developmental disabilities or mental disorders.” This
note will only focus on the amenability determination as that was the issue of contention in State v. Rudy B. (Rudy II), 2010-NMSC-045, 234 P.3d 726, cert. denied, 131
S.Ct. 2098 (2011).
97. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20.
98. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(C).
99. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-17(A)(3) (2009).
100. State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012, ¶ 46, 229 P.3d 474, 485–86.
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waive the amenability determination.101 After the amenability determination, the trial court is required to obtain an additional predisposition report prior to sentencing a youthful offender, regardless of whether the
child is to be sentenced in the juvenile system or adult system.102 It was
this modern statutory scheme that was applied to the child in Rudy B.
C. Apprendi v. New Jersey
Rudy B. dealt with whether the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey103 changed the procedures applicable to amenability
determinations in New Mexico, which ultimately would have changed the
way youthful offenders are sentenced. In Apprendi, the U.S. Supreme
Court held, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”104
This is an interpretation of the constitutional rights provided by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment105 and the Sixth Amendment,106
which apply to state prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment.107
1. Facts of Apprendi
The defendant in Apprendi was indicted for twenty-three offenses
alleging his involvement in four separate shootings and for various weapons charges.108 He pleaded guilty to two counts of firearm possession for
an unlawful purpose and one count of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb; the remaining charges were dismissed.109 New Jersey had a
“hate crime” law that served as a sentencing enhancement if the trial
court judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the offense
was committed “with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of
individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual ori-

101. Id.
102. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-17(A)(3); see also State v. Jose S., 2007-NMCA-146, ¶
17, 171 P.3d 768, 772 (holding that a separate sentencing hearing distinct from the
amenability hearing is required before sentencing a youthful offender as an adult).
103. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
104. Id. at 490.
105. “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
106. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
107. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
108. Id. at 469.
109. Id. at 469–70.
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entation or ethnicity.”110 The defendant allegedly targeted an AfricanAmerican family that had recently moved into an all-white neighborhood.111 Without the sentencing enhancement, the defendant faced a
maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment,112 but with the sentencing enhancement, he faced a maximum sentence of thirty years imprisonment.113 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the
purpose of the shooting, and it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had acted with the purpose to intimidate as
contemplated by the hate crime statute;114 accordingly, it ordered an enhanced sentence on one of the counts.115 Both the appeals court and the
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the sentence.116
2. Rationale of Apprendi
A judge has considerable discretion in imposing a sentence within
the range prescribed by statute, and he or she is well within judicial authority to consider factors relating to both the offense and the offender in
exercising that discretion.117 A judge’s discretion is limited only by the
statutory limits imposed by the legislature.118 A legislative scheme that
imposes a sentence exceeding a defendant’s liability as determined by the
guilty verdict alone is inconsistent with the limits on a judge’s discretion
to adhere to statutory legal penalties.119 Submitting all facts to the jury
with the requirement that it find those facts beyond a reasonable doubt is
necessary for a variety of reasons, including the risk involved with erroneous deprivation of liberty and the stigma that accompanies a criminal
conviction.120 The deprivation of liberty and stigma associated with a
criminal conviction are heightened when a defendant faces a sentence beyond what is provided for in the statute.121 This deprivation and stigma

110. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999–2000) (deleted by amendment
2001).
111. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
112. The plea agreement provided for a concurrent sentence for the unlawful possession of the antipersonnel bomb and consecutive sentences for the two counts of
firearm possession for an unlawful purpose. Id. at 470.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 470–71.
115. Id. at 471.
116. Id. at 471–72.
117. Id. at 481.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 482–83.
120. Id. at 484–85.
121. Id. at 484.
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have constitutional significance.122 The U.S. Supreme Court was clear in
its adoption of the rule, stating: “[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to
remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed
range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally
clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.”123
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s purpose for
committing the crime required an evaluation of his state of mind or intent, for all practical purposes, an “element” of the crime.124 “Whereas
recidivism ‘does not relate to the commission of the offense’ itself, New
Jersey’s [hate crime] purpose inquiry goes precisely to what happened in
the ‘commission of the offense.’”125 The Supreme Court explained, however, that the rule reaches beyond elements of the crime, and the relevant
inquiry is whether the required finding exposes the defendant to greater
punishment than that authorized by a finding of guilt alone.126
D. Oregon v. Ice
Rudy B. relied heavily on Oregon v. Ice,127 in which the U.S. Supreme Court applied its decision from Apprendi to determine whether a
judge had the discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences.
The specific issue decided in Ice was whether the Apprendi rule required
a jury finding to impose consecutive sentences for multiple offenses.128
Under common law in most states, the trial court judge had discretion to
impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences.129 The prevailing statute at issue in Ice required a judge to make specific factual findings
before he or she could exercise such discretion.130 The U.S. Supreme
Court held, “in light of historical practice and the authority of States over

122. Id. at 495.
123. Id. at 490 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
124. Id. at 493.
125. Id. at 496 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523
U.S. 224, 244 (1998)).
126. Id. at 494.
127. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009).
128. Id. at 163.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 165. A judge may impose consecutive sentences for simultaneously-sentenced offenses that do not arise from the same continuous and uninterrupted conduct or for offenses that do arise from the same continuous and uninterrupted
conduct if the judge finds the offense indicated a willingness of the defendant to commit more than one offense or the offense caused or created a greater risk to the victim
or to a different victim. OR. REV. STAT. § 137.123(1) (2007).
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administration of their criminal justice systems,” a jury is not required to
make the factual findings necessary for a judge to impose consecutive
sentences.131
1. Facts of Ice
The defendant in Ice entered into an apartment and sexually assaulted an eleven-year-old girl on two different occasions during a span of
eight months.132 At sentencing, the judge made the factual findings required by statute for consecutive sentences and sentenced the defendant
consecutively for two burglary offenses and two sexual assault offenses.133
The defendant was sentenced concurrently for other offenses stemming
from the two incidents.134
2. Rationale of Ice
The U.S. Supreme Court distinguished Ice from the previous line of
Apprendi cases because Ice involved multiple offenses and the previous
cases involved sentencing for a discrete offense.135 After reviewing the
purposes behind the Apprendi decision,136 the Supreme Court concluded
that two elements must be considered before extending the Apprendi rule
to such a case: historical practice and state sovereignty.137 The Supreme
Court explained that the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent
sentences had not traditionally been within the domain of the jury, but
rather had traditionally been within the realm of the states to administer
their criminal justice systems.138 Historically, the prevailing practice was
for judges to impose consecutive sentences automatically, and the modern statutes actually provided greater protections than the historical practice.139 The Supreme Court concluded that there was “no
encroachment . . . by the judge upon facts historically found by the jury,
nor any threat to the jury’s domain as a bulwark at trial between the State
and the accused.”140
131. Ice, 555 U.S. at 164.
132. Id. at 165.
133. Id. at 165–66.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 167.
136. The Ice Court explained that the Apprendi rule is intended to preserve the
jury’s historic role to protect the defendant from a state during the trial process and to
prevent legislative encroachment on the jury’s domain with both of these inquiries
made against the backdrop of state sovereignty. Id. at 168.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 168–69.
140. Id. at 169.
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3. Dissent in Ice
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Souter, and
Justice Thomas dissented in Ice, concluding that the decision directly conflicted with Apprendi and subsequent case law because the statute exposed defendants to sentencing enhancements based on facts found by
judges, rather than juries.141 The dissent argued that the distinction applied by the majority—that the Apprendi rule applied only to the length
of a sentence for a single crime and not for the total sentence for the
defendant—was not supported by Apprendi and its progeny, by the history of fact finding required to impose consecutive sentences, or by
logic.142 The dissent argued that the Sixth Amendment’s requirement, as
explained by Apprendi, is simply not satisfied when a judge finds additional facts to enhance a defendant’s sentence by imposing consecutive
sentences.143
E. State v. Gonzales
New Mexico’s appellate courts first addressed whether the Apprendi
rule applied to amenability determinations in State v. Gonzales.144 Gonzales was decided by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in 2001. The court
of appeals held that the Apprendi rule was not applicable to amenability
determinations145 and that such determinations did not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.146
1. Facts of Gonzales
The defendant child was fourteen at the time that he participated in
a string of burglaries that resulted in the homicide of one homeowner and
injury to a neighbor. The child pleaded guilty to second-degree murder,
aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, and two counts of aggravated
assault.147 The trial court found that the child was not amenable to rehabilitative treatment and sentenced him to twenty-two years in an adult
penitentiary.148

141. Id. at 173 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 178.
144. Gonzales I, 2001-NMCA-025, 24 P.3d 776.
145. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(B) (2009).
146. Gonzales I, 2001-NMCA-025, ¶ 1, 24 P.3d at 779. The court also applied this
ruling to eligibility commitments, but such determinations are outside the scope of
this note. See supra note 96.
147. Gonzales I, 2001-NMCA-025, ¶¶ 2–5, 24 P.3d at 779.
148. Id. ¶ 5, 24 P.3d at 779.

R
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2. Rationale of Gonzales
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reasoned that Apprendi supported its decision because the trial court has discretion to consider facts
about the underlying offense as well as the offender in making sentencing
determinations within the range allowable by the statute.149 The court of
appeals concluded that the child was sentenced within the range allowable by statute because the Delinquency Act authorized the mandatory
adult sentence if the court made the findings necessary to invoke an adult
sentence.150 Since the range of possible sentences was fixed depending on
whether the child was sentenced as an adult or juvenile, the court of appeals held that the findings made by the trial court did not result in the
child being sentenced for a greater offense.151
The conclusions originally reached by the New Mexico Court of Appeals have since been foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Blakely v. Washington.152 Blakely defined the statutory maximum:
[T]he “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. . . . In
other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts,
but the maximum he may impose without any additional
findings.153

3. Habeas Relief Sought and Denied
In 2008, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of
habeas relief for the child in Gonzales v. Tafoya.154 The child alleged that
his due process rights were violated by finding that he was not amenable
to treatment or eligible for commitment without submitting those findings to a jury pursuant to Apprendi.155 As to the Apprendi claim, the
Tenth Circuit held that the child was not entitled to a jury trial for the
amenability determination and that the district court did not unreasonably apply federal law in rejecting his claim.156 The Tenth Circuit applied
149. Id. ¶ 29, 24 P.3d at 785.
150. Id. ¶ 31, 24 P.3d at 785; see also NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(E).
151. Gonzales I, 2001-NMCA-025, ¶ 31, 24 P.3d at 785.
152. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
153. Id. at 303–04 (emphasis in original).
154. Gonzales II, 515 F.3d 1097 (2008).
155. The child also alleged that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the evidence was insufficient to
find him non-amenable to treatment or eligible for commitment. Id. at 1101.
156. Id. at 1101–02.
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state and federal law as of 2000, the date Apprendi was decided, because
the post-Apprendi decisions could not be retroactively applied on habeas
review,157 and it ultimately concluded that Kent v. United States was the
controlling case for the constitutionality of waiver proceedings.158
The Tenth Circuit considered applying the Apprendi rule to juvenile
waiver proceedings and noted that most courts have determined that the
Apprendi rule should not be applied to such proceedings.159 Courts generally distinguished waiver proceedings from Apprendi based on three reasons: waiver proceedings establish the court’s jurisdiction; juveniles do
not enjoy the same rights as criminal defendants, such as the right to jury
trials; and waiver proceedings required findings that were unrelated to
culpability, were not findings of historical facts, and required expertise
that juries lacked.160 The court then acknowledged that some of the distinguishing characteristics were inapplicable in New Mexico because waiver
proceedings are not pretrial proceedings that establish jurisdiction and
juveniles do have state law rights to jury trials.161 The Tenth Circuit, however, was satisfied that the distinction between the types of findings made
in amenability determinations were sufficiently distinguishable from the
types of findings made in Apprendi that required submission to a jury
because some of the findings required expertise and reasoned judgment
to make a predictive, rather than historical, assessment.162
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in deciding Rudy B., also relied
on the predictive nature of the findings, among other reasons, to hold
that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial for amenability
determinations.163
III. STATE V. RUDY B.
State v. Rudy B.164 addressed two issues: (1) whether the New Mexico Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenge
to judge-made amenability determinations after Child Rudy B. (hereafter
157. Id. at 1110.
158. Id. at 1115. In Kent v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that waiver
proceedings must comply with “the essentials of due process and fair treatment[,]”
but it did not set forth the requirement for a jury trial for such proceedings. 383 U.S.
541, 561 (1966).
159. Gonzales II, 515 F.3d at 1111.
160. Id. at 1111–12.
161. Id. at 1112–13.
162. Id. at 1113.
163. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 37, 234 P.3d 726, 735, cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2098
(2011); see also infra Part III.D.
164. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, 234 P.3d 726.
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“Rudy”) waived his right to appeal in his plea agreement; and (2)
whether the court of appeals erred when it declared that judge-made
amenability determinations were unconstitutional.165 Rudy challenged the
constitutionality of New Mexico’s approach to amenability determinations under NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-20 under the Sixth Amendment’s
right to a jury trial. Specifically, Rudy argued that a jury, rather than a
judge, must make the amenability determination.166 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional issue was not integral to the resolution of the constitutional issue before it, and therefore, it declined to
decide whether Rudy’s waiver of his right to appeal extended to the constitutional challenge.167 The decision in Rudy B. rested on the New Mexico Supreme Court’s analysis of whether a jury was required to make the
amenability determination; accordingly, this note is limited to that issue.
A. Facts of Rudy B.
Rudy was seventeen when he participated in a gang fight in a parking lot.168 Believing that one of the opposing gang members had a gun,
Rudy pulled out his gun and shot three people.169 All three people survived, but one was rendered a quadriplegic.170 Rudy was indicted on three
counts of shooting from a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily harm,
three counts of aggravated battery with an deadly weapon, one count of
unlawful possession of a handgun by a minor, and one count of tampering
with evidence.171 Rudy pleaded guilty to two counts of shooting from a
motor vehicle resulting in great bodily injury and to two counts of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon; the remaining charges were dismissed.172 The offenses to which he pleaded guilty qualified as youthful
offender offenses.173 The plea agreement provided that sentencing would
occur as provided by law and that Rudy would be sentenced after an
amenability hearing pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-20 (2009).174
The plea agreement specified that the maximum sentence possible for a
juvenile disposition was commitment in a juvenile facility until Rudy
reached the age of twenty-one and the maximum sentence possible for an
165. Id. ¶ 10, 234 P.3d at 728–29.
166. Id. ¶ 1, 234 P.3d at 727.
167. Id. ¶ 16, 234 P.3d at 729–30.
168. Id. ¶ 3, 234 P.3d at 727.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. ¶ 4, 234 P.3d at 727.
172. Id.
173. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(J) (2009).
174. State’s Brief in Chief at 1, Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, 234 P.3d 726 (No.
31,909); see also Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 5, 234 P.3d at 727.
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adult sentence was twenty-six years imprisonment in an adult
penitentiary.175
At the amenability hearing, the parties presented conflicting evidence to the trial court regarding Rudy’s amenability to rehabilitative
treatment, and the trial court found that the evidence presented was inadequate for it to determine if there were sufficient programs and facilities
available to rehabilitate Rudy.176 Because the trial court was unable to
make its amenability determination without this information, it deferred
its ruling until the parties submitted additional evidence regarding the
services and facilities available to rehabilitate Rudy.177 At the subsequent
amenability hearing, the trial court found that Rudy was not amenable to
rehabilitative treatment because there were no services and facilities
available that could rehabilitate him to the level that would adequately
protect the public.178
B. Summary of Procedural History in Rudy B.
The trial court found that Rudy was not amenable to rehabilitative
treatment and sentenced him as an adult to twenty-five years in an adult
penitentiary.179 The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s amenability determination and remanded the case for resentencing.180 The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari upon the
state’s appeal and reversed the court of appeals, remanding the case back
to the court of appeals for consideration of two issues unrelated to the
constitutionality of judge-made amenability determinations.181 On remand, the court of appeals affirmed on both issues, ultimately affirming
Rudy’s original sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment.182
C. The Decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Rudy B.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the Apprendi rule applied to amenability determinations, overruling its previous decision in
Gonzales.183 It concluded that the judge-made amenability determinations
175. State’s Brief in Chief, supra note 174, at 1–2.
176. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 7, 234 P.3d at 728.
177. Id.
178. Id. ¶ 8, 234 P.3d at 728. Adequate protection of the public is one of the eight
factors to be considered by the trial court judge before making an amenability determination. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(C)(7) (2009).
179. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 8, 234 P.3d at 728.
180. State v. Rudy B. (Rudy I), 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 61, 216 P.3d 810, 826.
181. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 60, 234 P.3d at 740.
182. State v. Rudy B. (Rudy III), No. 27,589, 2011 WL 2041497, at *1 (N.M. Ct.
App. Apr. 26, 2011).
183. Rudy I, 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 53, 216 P.3d at 824; see generally supra Part II.E.
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that were required to invoke adult sentences were unconstitutional because amenability determinations have the effect of increasing a child’s
sentence based on facts other than those necessary for the verdict and, as
such, must be made by a jury.184 It explained that an amenability determination “operate[s] as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense”185 and is therefore within the jury’s exclusive province.186
The New Mexico Court of Appeals analyzed the progression of
cases that had been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court since Apprendi,187
ultimately resting the majority of its analysis on Ice and Ring v. Arizona.188 Ice established the principle that the Apprendi rule should be extended only to cases in which the jury had historically played a role in the
issues to be decided.189 The U.S. Supreme Court in Ice concluded that the
jury did not historically play a role in determining whether consecutive or
concurrent sentences were imposed, and therefore, the Apprendi rule did
not apply.190 The U.S. Supreme Court in Ring, in comparison, applied the
Apprendi line of reasoning and concluded that aggravating factors, which
increased a defendant’s statutory sentence, must be found by a jury.191
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reasoned that Rudy B. was distinguishable from Ice because an amenability determination cannot “reasonably be compared” to the determination of whether to impose
consecutive or concurrent sentences.192 The court of appeals explained
that in Ice, the jury had already determined the facts required to impose
the sentence for each offense, and the judge’s role was only to determine
the manner in which the sentences would be served.193 In Rudy’s case, the
facts required to impose an adult sentence were not determined by the
verdict, but solely by the judge at a post-trial amenability hearing.194 The
court of appeals relied on Cunningham v. California195 for the proposition
that “[i]f the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if, instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose the longer term,

184. Rudy I, 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 53, 216 P.3d at 824.
185. Id. ¶ 32, 216 P.3d at 820 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Id. ¶ 33, 216 P.3d at 820.
187. Id. ¶¶ 20–22, 216 P.3d at 816–19.
188. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (invalidating judge-made findings of
aggravating factors that allowed the imposition of the death penalty following a conviction of guilt by a jury).
189. Rudy I, 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 22, 216 P.3d at 817; see also supra Part II.D.
190. Rudy I, 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 22, 216 P.3d at 817–18.
191. Id. ¶ 30, 216 P.3d at 819 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Id. ¶ 31, 216 P.3d at 820.
193. Id. ¶ 31, 216 P.3d at 819–20.
194. Id. ¶ 31, 216 P.3d at 820.
195. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
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the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied.”196 The court of appeals concluded that Ice did not foreclose the application of the Apprendi
rule to amenability determinations and that such determinations are exclusively within the jury’s province because they are similar to aggravating factors.197 The court of appeals thus decided that Rudy B. was more
like Ring than Ice because the amenability determination increased
Rudy’s criminal liability from a juvenile sentence to an adult sentence,
operating as the “functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.”198 The court of appeals then reviewed its decision in Gonzales and
provided support for its departure from that previous holding.199
D. The Decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Rudy B.
1. The Holding of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Rudy B.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the New Mexico Court of
Appeals and held that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to
make the evidentiary findings for amenability determinations, thereby
upholding the statutory preference for judge-made amenability determinations.200 The New Mexico Supreme Court based its holding largely on
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ice.201 The New Mexico Supreme
Court concluded that applying the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations would be an extension of the rule because amenability determinations are not offense-specific,202 they are predictive rather than
retrospective,203 and they are made in the juvenile justice context.204 The
supreme court ultimately held such an extension improper because amenability determinations have not traditionally been made by a jury, and
applying the Apprendi rule to such determinations would impose on the
state’s traditional role of administering its juvenile criminal justice
system.205

196. Rudy I, 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 31, 216 P.3d at 820 (quoting Cunningham, 549
U.S. at 290).
197. Id. ¶ 33, 216 P.3d at 820.
198. Id. ¶ 32, 216 P.3d at 820.
199. Id. ¶¶ 34–54, 216 P.3d at 820–25.
200. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 2, 234 P.3d 726, 727, cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2098
(2011).
201. Id.; see Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009).
202. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 36, 234 P.3d at 735.
203. Id. ¶ 37, 234 P.3d at 735.
204. Id. ¶ 39, 234 P.3d at 735.
205. Id. ¶ 59, 234 P.3d at 740.
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2. The Rationale of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Rudy B.
The New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that NMSA 1978,
Sections 32A-2-20(B) (2009) and 32A-2-20(C) (2009) allow a trial court
judge to increase a juvenile’s criminal penalty potentially “far beyond”
the statutory maximum provided for in the Delinquency Act, by making
factual determinations as to a child’s amenability to rehabilitative treatment.206 The amenability determination that is made by a trial court judge
includes findings beyond those contained in the verdict or admitted by a
child, and it serves to increase the maximum sentence as contemplated in
Blakely.207 Based on the jurisprudence up until Cunningham v. California208 in 2007, the supreme court in Rudy B. admitted that judge-made
amenability determinations would violate the Apprendi rule.209 However,
the supreme court concluded that in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ice, the Apprendi rule did not apply to amenability determinations.210 The New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that amenability
determinations are collateral decisions that are not tied to the offenses
charged and that the Apprendi rule was never meant to extend to collateral decisions.211
The New Mexico Supreme Court first reviewed whether applying
the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations would be an extension
of that rule and then determined whether an extension would be proper
in light of Ice. Under Ice, the historical role of the jury and the state
sovereignty were to be considered when applying the Apprendi rule beyond the context of sentencing statutes.212 The supreme court determined
that the amenability determination was not properly subject to the Apprendi rule because it is not offense specific or within the traditional domain of the jury.213 Applying the Apprendi rule to amenability
determinations would extend the rule beyond its jurisprudential limits because the findings for amenability determinations are not offense specific,
like the findings required for consecutive or concurrent sentencing were
not offense specific in Ice.214 The supreme court explained that the ame-

206. Id. ¶ 24, 234 P.3d at 732.
207. Id. “The relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without
any additional findings.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004).
208. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
209. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 24, 234 P.3d at 732.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. ¶ 33, 234 P.3d at 734.
213. Id. ¶ 36, 234 P.3d at 735.
214. Id. ¶ 34, 234 P.3d at 734.
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nability determination is focused on the child, rather than the offense
committed, but it then acknowledged that offense-specific factors must be
considered by the trial court judge in making an amenability determination.215 It reconciled this discrepancy by noting that other factors, which
are not offense specific, must also be considered by the trial court judge
when making an amenability determination.216 Even though the supreme
court concluded that amenability determinations, as a whole, are not offense specific, it directed that three of the offense-specific factors217 must
indeed be submitted to the jury.218
The New Mexico Supreme Court also concluded that applying the
Apprendi rule to amenability determinations would extend the rule because amenability determinations are predictive and uncertain.219 Because
of the level of uncertainty and the need for informed judgment, such inquiries are not conducive to a jury decision beyond a reasonable doubt.220
The supreme court noted that the Apprendi rule had traditionally been
applied to issues that involved historical fact finding and not to forwardlooking determinations, such as amenability determinations.221 After outlining this distinction, the supreme court acknowledged that the difference between predictive and retrospective findings were not relevant to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ice.222
Finally, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that applying
the Apprendi rule to amenability decisions would extend the rule because
the case before it dealt with the juvenile justice system, rather than the
adult justice system.223 States generally have more discretion to create and

215. Id. ¶¶ 34–35, 234 P.3d at 734.
216. Id. ¶ 35, 234 P.3d at 734; see NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(5)–(7) (2009); see also
supra Part II.B.
217. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(2)–(4) provides that the trial court judge must consider, among other factors, whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; whether a firearm was used to commit
the alleged offense; and whether the alleged offense was against persons or property,
with greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted; see also supra Part II.B.
218. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 36, 234 P.3d at 735.
219. Id. ¶ 37, 234 P.3d at 735.
220. Id.
221. Id. But see Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 277–79 (2007) (applying
the Apprendi rule to California’s determinate sentencing law, which required consideration of facts relating to the offense and the offender).
222. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 38, 234 P.3d at 735.
223. Id. ¶ 39, 234 P.3d at 735.
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administer their own juvenile justice systems, which the supreme court
determined was especially important in light of the reasoning in Ice.224
Once the New Mexico Supreme Court decided that applying the
Apprendi rule to amenability determinations would extend the rule beyond its existing jurisprudential limits, it then reviewed whether such an
extension was proper in light of historical practice and state sovereignty
as discussed in Ice.225 The New Mexico Supreme Court explained that
New Mexico’s procedure for post-trial amenability determinations is different, but analogous to, pretrial waiver or transfer proceedings in other
states.226 In both instances, the inquiry is whether a child should be subjected to adult consequences, which is only determined after deciding
whether a child is amenable to rehabilitative treatment in the juvenile
system.227 Although most cases deciding whether the Apprendi rule applied to waiver proceedings have held that it did not apply, the New Mexico Supreme Court placed little emphasis on the existing case law because
the cases were decided prior to Ice.228 The supreme court noted that all of
the forty-five states that have waiver proceedings allow the trial court
judge to make the waiver decision after making specific findings.229 In
New Mexico, the trial court judge has had the authority to make amenability determinations since the inception of the juvenile code, regardless
of whether the proceedings occurred before trial or after trial.230 Historically then, since amenability determinations have been incorporated into
criminal proceedings in New Mexico, the decision has always been left to
the trial court judge’s discretion.231 The supreme court concluded that extending the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations was not proper
in light of historical practice because such determinations have “never
been based upon facts historically found by the jury, and so it cannot be a
threat to the jury’s domain as preserved in the U.S. Constitution.”232
The New Mexico Supreme Court then turned to the second factor
discussed in Ice: state sovereignty as it relates to the ability of states to

224. Id. The supreme court relied on McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971), which held there is no right to a jury trial in the juvenile court system.
225. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 40, 234 P.3d at 735.
226. Id. ¶ 43, 234 P.3d at 736. Recall that waiver proceedings in New Mexico happen at the post-trial sentencing phase for all children except serious youthful offenders, rather than the pretrial phase.
227. Id. ¶ 44, 234 P.3d at 737.
228. Id. ¶ 45, 234 P.3d at 737.
229. Id. ¶ 46, 234 P.3d at 737.
230. Id. ¶ 47, 234 P.3d at 737.
231. Id. ¶ 48, 234 P.3d at 738.
232. Id. ¶ 53, 234 P.3d at 739.
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administer their own criminal justice systems.233 The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that states typically have had independence to
administer the adjudication and disposition of juvenile offenders and
that, thus, deference to the state in the administration of its juvenile justice system is proper.234 Requiring juries to make amenability determinations would be inconsistent with state sovereignty in this area, especially
since the legislature has the power to remove a child from the protections
of the juvenile system altogether in certain circumstances.235 The supreme
court reasoned that if the legislature had the ability to deny children “the
right to juvenile procedures and dispositions . . . then [it] ought to be able
to extend greater protection to children.”236
The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that applying the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations would create significant administrative burdens.237 First, it would result in a slippery slope in which a
trial court judge’s discretion to apply other sentencing determinations
would be removed.238 Second, it would result in bifurcated proceedings
requiring a jury finding for the verdict and a separate jury finding for
amenability.239
3. The Dissent of Justice Chavez in Rudy B.
Justice Chavez dissented in Rudy B. and asserted that the majority
ruled incorrectly because a child is entitled to the same constitutional
protections as an adult under New Mexico law.240 The dissent reasoned
that the majority incorrectly applied Ice because historical practice and
state sovereignty supported the opposite conclusion.241 The dissent noted
that “[t]he essential inquiry [from Ice] is whether the findings involve a
sentence for a discrete offense.”242 Rudy’s case is distinguishable from Ice
because Rudy was sentenced for a discrete offense.243

233. Id. ¶ 54, 234 P.3d at 739.
234. Id. ¶ 56, 234 P.3d at 739–40.
235. Id. ¶ 57, 234 P.3d at 740; see also NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(H) (2009) (providing
that children who are defined as serious youthful offenders are not delinquent children subject to the Delinquency Act).
236. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 57, 234 P.3d at 740.
237. Id. ¶ 58, 234 P.3d at 740.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. ¶ 62, 234 P.3d at 741 (Chavez, J., dissenting); see NMSA 1978, § 32A-214(A) (2009) (stating that “a child is entitled to the same basic rights as an adult,
except as otherwise provided in the Children’s Code”).
241. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 67, 234 P.3d at 742.
242. Id. ¶ 75, 234 P.3d at 744.
243. Id. ¶ 67, 234 P.3d at 742.
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The dissent determined that the majority erred by looking only to
the historical practice since the separate juvenile justice system was enacted because this approach “ignore[d] 125 years of historical common
law practice.”244 The common law practice was for a jury to decide
whether a juvenile between fourteen and eighteen years old would be
sentenced as an adult,245 which was distinguishable from Ice because the
common law practice of deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences was left to the judge.246
The dissent explained that when the state seeks to impose an adult
sentence on a child, the goal becomes punishment, rather than rehabilitation, in the same way the state would seek to punish an adult.247 As such,
it is fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional to impose an adult sentence on a child by proving only the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.248 The majority’s decision is inconsistent with
the legislature’s intent to protect children from adult consequences because it does not make sense to protect children from adult consequences
yet deprive them of the constitutional protections afforded to adults.249
Notwithstanding McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,250 the dissent expressed that
juveniles in New Mexico likely have a federal constitutional right to a
jury trial, so the jury should serve the same functions as it does in the
adult system.251 The dissent concluded that Apprendi and Ice support a
requirement for a jury finding of the facts required to sentence a child as
an adult unless those facts are waived or admitted by the child; otherwise,
the judge is only authorized to impose a juvenile disposition.252
The dissent explained that the majority’s assertion that the predictive factors253 required for an amenability determination removed Rudy’s
case from the realm of Apprendi is not supported by case law because

244. Id. ¶ 68, 234 P.3d at 742.
245. Id.; see also supra Part II.A.
246. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 69, 234 P.3d at 742–43 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
247. Id. ¶ 70, 234 P.3d at 743.
248. Id. ¶ 71, 234 P.3d at 743.
249. Id. ¶ 77, 234 P.3d at 744.
250. 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding children have no federal constitutional right to a
jury trial in adjudicative proceedings).
251. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 78, 234 P.3d at 744 (Chavez, J., dissenting). The
dissent opines that if the McKeiver issue had been decided regarding the New Mexico
juvenile justice system, it would have likely warranted a different result because New
Mexico criminally prosecutes some juvenile offenders as adults, and the system is not
like the informal protective proceeding that was at issue in McKeiver. Id.
252. Id. ¶ 72, 234 P.3d at 743.
253. See id. ¶ 35, 234 P.3d at 734 (majority opinion).
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Cunningham addressed such a situation.254 In Cunningham, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a system imposing a sentencing enhancement
“based on facts relating to the crime, the accused, or other facts considered to be circumstances in aggravation.”255 Similarly, in State v.
Frawley,256 the New Mexico Supreme Court invalidated a system imposing a sentencing enhancement based on facts relating to the offense and
the offender.257 Rudy could not be sentenced as an adult until the trial
court judge made additional findings related to the offense and the offender.258 An amenability hearing is essentially the same as a hearing on
the aggravated circumstances of the offense and the offender. At common law, a child fourteen to eighteen years old was entitled to the same
constitutional protections as an adult; therefore, youthful offenders
should be afforded the same constitutional protections afforded to adults
today.259 The dissent argued that if the statute automatically sentenced
youthful offenders as adults, but allowed the judge to find mitigating factors to reduce the sentence, it would be constitutional.260 However, the
legislation as written improperly allows a trial court judge to make the
factual findings required before an adult sentence can be imposed.261
IV. ANALYSIS
Rudy B. foreclosed the opportunity for youthful offenders to have
amenability determinations made by a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The New Mexico Supreme Court largely based its decision
whether to apply the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations on the
analysis used in Ice.262 Ice provided the requirement of reviewing historical practice and considering state sovereignty when deciding whether the
Apprendi rule should be extended in a given situation.263 The following
analysis of Rudy B. discusses the twin considerations provided in Ice,
whether the Ice analysis should even be applied to amenability determinations, and the importance of the jury system and how it extends to juvenile proceedings.
254.
255.
256.
257.
phasis
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. ¶ 74, 234 P.3d at 743–44 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis in original).
2007-NMSC-057, 172 P.3d 144.
Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 74, 234 P.3d at 744 (Chavez, J., dissenting) (emadded).
Id. ¶ 75, 234 P.3d at 744.
Id. ¶ 81, 234 P.3d at 745.
Id. ¶ 83, 234 P.3d at 745.
Id.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part II.D.
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A. Historical Practice
The first consideration provided in Ice was historical practice. The
decision in Rudy B. hinged on historical practice and the traditional role
of the jury.264 Although “historical pedigree can give a procedural practice a presumption of constitutionality . . . the presumption must surely
be rebuttable.”265 Included in historical practice is how longstanding a
procedure is and how uniformly it has been applied.266 Historical practice
can be gauged from different points in history, and the outcome in Rudy
B. depended largely on the scope of historical practice that was considered by the court. This query, however, presents an additional question:
what is the applicable historical practice? Is the applicable historical practice that which relates specifically to jury involvement with amenability
determinations, to jury involvement with children in the criminal justice
system generally, or to something broader, such as jury involvement in
sentencing in criminal cases?
There is little guidance in the application of the historical practice
analysis as it relates to Apprendi because this nuance in the Apprendi line
of cases is not well-developed. There are, however, other areas of law
where historical practice has been applied, such as determining the scope
of fundamental rights. Indeed, historical practice is the primary guide in
determining whether a principle is fundamental.267
For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick,268 the U.S. Supreme Court
looked at historical practice when determining if homosexual sodomy was
a fundamental right and thus constitutionally protected. It discussed that
such activity was a criminal offense at common law prohibited by all of
the original thirteen states that ratified the Bill of Rights.269 It then looked
at the laws in 1961, when all states prohibited sodomy, and the laws at the
time of the decision in 1986, when twenty-four states and the District of
Columbia prohibited sodomy.270 In light of this history, the Supreme
Court determined that the practice could not be deemed to be “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”271 However, in a concurring
opinion, Justice Burger reviewed historical practice starting further back
in history than was considered by the majority. Justice Burger looked to

264. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 59, 234 P.3d at 740.
265. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment).
266. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 51 (1996).
267. Id. at 43.
268. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
269. Id. at 192.
270. Id. at 192–93.
271. Id. at 193.
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the history of Western civilization, Roman law, and the English common
law.272
In Lawrence v. Texas,273 the case that overruled Bowers, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that a different point in time was the proper
gauge of historical practice. The Supreme Court stated “[t]he Nation’s
laws and traditions in the past half century are most relevant here.”274 The
Supreme Court focused the most attention on historical practice since the
decision in Bowers,275 which only included the preceding seventeen years.
These cases demonstrate that “historical practice” is not neatly defined
and is indeed a flexible determination open to interpretation.
Bowers and Lawrence demonstrate another relevant consideration
to Rudy B.: the framing of the matter at issue. In Bowers, the right was
framed as the right to engage in homosexual sodomy,276 whereas in Lawrence, the right was framed more broadly as the right to live with dignity
as free persons.277 Just as this framing determined the outcome in these
two cases regarding the same issue, so the framing determines the appropriate outcome in the matter of Rudy B. If the issue is framed narrowly to
inquire whether the historical practice was to have amenability determinations decided by a jury, then the appropriate response would be to answer in the negative. If, however, the issue is framed more broadly to
inquire if the historical practice was to have the jury originally involved
with children in the criminal justice system or whether sentencing decisions have historically been in the hands of the jury, then the appropriate
response would be to answer in the affirmative.
The relevant historical practice could be gauged from various points
in history: from the time post-trial amenability decisions were added to
the Children’s Code in 1993, from the time when pretrial amenability decisions were employed, from the time when New Mexico began to treat
children differently in 1917, from the time at the framing of the Bill of
Rights, or at common law. Juries have not historically been involved with
waiver decisions because such decisions did not exist at common law.278
But because the type of amenability determination in New Mexico is
unique to the state,279 another possible option to gauge the historical practice is at the time of statehood. This would support requiring jury findings

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 196–97.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 559.
Id.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
Gonzales II, 515 F.3d 1097, 1115 (2008).
See INST. OF PUB. LAW, supra note 8, at 1-7.

R
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in juvenile proceedings because at the time of statehood, juveniles were
treated just like adults. However, instead of determining whether the jury
has traditionally played a role in amenability determinations, the appropriate inquiry could be phrased as whether the jury has traditionally
played a role in sentencing decisions because the length of imprisonment
is the underlying issue in Apprendi.
It is obvious that “[n]o historical foundation extending down the
centuries into the common law required submission of the amenability . . . questions” to a jury,280 but there is a historical foundation that requires the submission of sentencing factors to a jury. In the United States,
juries participated in sentencing until the twentieth century.281 At that
time, jury sentencing began to be replaced by discretionary judicial sentencing.282 By sentencing a child as an adult, the court is essentially removing the child from the juvenile system and placing the child in the
adult system with no further protections. When this happens, the issue
becomes more like the U.S. Supreme Court cases that require fact finding
to be done by the jury.
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Rudy B. chose to review historical practice as it relates to amenability determinations, specifically
whether to try and sentence a child as an adult, and set the historical
benchmark as 1917 when New Mexico implemented separate proceedings
for juveniles.283 The supreme court determined that judges have made
amenability determinations for as long as they have been a part of the
New Mexico juvenile criminal justice system.284
The decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court ignored the factors
that go into the amenability decision. Indeed, the first four statutory factors have historically been made by a jury, and the next three factors are
properly within the province of the jury after Cunningham.285 Additionally, Ice provided that the relevant inquiry for Apprendi application is
“whether the finding of a particular fact was understood as within ‘the
domain of the jury . . . by those who framed the Bill of Rights.’”286 If the
understanding of the Framers is important in the analysis, then it would

280. Gonzales II, 515 F.3d at 1116.
281. Vannella, supra note 53, at 745.
282. Id.
283. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 48, 234 P.3d 726, 738, cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2098
(2011).
284. Id.
285. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (invalidating California’s determinate sentencing law that imposed a sentencing enhancement based on the facts
of the crime, the accused, or other aggravating circumstances).
286. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168 (2009).

R
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appear that the appropriate time to gauge historical practice would be
from the founding of the country. In that case, the dissent in Rudy B.
made a compelling argument that it was the Framers’ understanding that
children between the ages of fourteen and eighteen were treated the
same as adults, including being afforded the same constitutional protections as adults.287 Therefore, at the time of the founding of the country,
the historical practice was for a jury to find the facts necessary for the
imposition of punishment on a child.288 The dissent in Rudy B. asserted
that the majority had not accurately analyzed the historical practice,289
and as Bowers and Lawrence indicate, the analysis of historical practice
can occur at different times depending on the circumstances.
B. State Sovereignty
The second consideration provided in Ice was state sovereignty and
the ability of states to administer their own criminal justice systems.
Criminal justice systems and especially juvenile justice systems are particularly within the states’ areas of exclusive control.290 Even though the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that some constitutional protections must
be afforded to juveniles,291 it has been more deferential to states in the
administration of their juvenile justice systems.292 This deference, however, is likely based on the different approach for juveniles where the
focus is on rehabilitation, rather than punishment. When a juvenile enters
the adult system, that same deference should not be present and the juvenile criminal process must then be administered using the same procedures as its adult counterparts.293
State sovereignty is intended to work as a constraint on federal
power,294 but here it is being used as a constraint on a federal right. Sovereignty generally is used in the context of states providing more rights to
their citizens than the federal government does, not taking away rights
that otherwise would be enjoyed. Indeed, the approach taken by the New
Mexico Supreme Court marked the first time it has taken away rights
under the guise of state sovereignty.295 The supreme court correctly noted

287. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 69, 234 P.3d at 742 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
288. Id. ¶ 67, 234 P.3d at 742.
289. Id. ¶ 68, 234 P.3d at 742.
290. Id. ¶ 54, 234 P.3d at 739 (majority opinion).
291. Id. ¶ 55, 234 P.3d at 739.
292. Id. ¶ 56, 234 P.3d at 740.
293. See infra Part IV.D.
294. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“powers not delegated to the United
States . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”).
295. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 67, 234 P.3d at 742 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
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that states are within their authority to completely remove amenability
determinations and automatically try and sentence juveniles as adults,296
and this would actually provide juveniles in New Mexico, or at least
youthful offenders, greater rights because then they would be afforded
the benefit of the Apprendi rule before sentencing.
The New Mexico Supreme Court viewed amenability determinations as providing greater protections to children,297 but this assertion is
true only if amenability determinations are subject to the Apprendi rule.
Allowing a judge to increase a juvenile’s sentence far beyond the statutory maximum based on one person’s findings does not provide children
greater protections. In the dissent’s opinion, honoring state sovereignty in
New Mexico supported submitting amenability determinations to the jury
because juveniles have the constitutional right to jury trials in New
Mexico.298
C. Should the Ice Analysis Even Be Applied to Amenability
Determinations?
The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that applying the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations would be an extension of the
rule.299 It would appear, however, that the historical practice analysis and
the role of the jury was always part of the Apprendi rule and not necessarily a component added by the later ruling in Ice.300 As the U.S. Supreme
Court stated in Ice, “[t]he [Apprendi] rule’s animating principle is the
preservation of the jury’s historic role as a bulwark between the State and

296. Id. ¶ 57, 234 P.3d at 740 (majority opinion).
297. Id.
298. Id. ¶ 67, 234 P.3d at 742 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
299. Id. ¶ 40, 234 P.3d at 735 (majority opinion).
300. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (recognizing that “the
historical foundation for our recognition of [the government’s requirement to prove
every element beyond a reasonable doubt] extends down centuries into the common
law”); Id. at 478 (stating that any distinction between an element and a sentencing
factor was unknown “as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation’s founding . . .”); Id. at 482–83 (stating “[t]he historic link between verdict and judgment . . . highlight the novelty of a legislative scheme that removes the jury from the
determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty
exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected
in the jury verdict alone”) (emphasis removed); Id. at 495 (explaining “[t]his concern
flows . . . from the historical pedigree of the jury . . .”); Id. at 497 (stating “[t]he procedure . . . challenged in this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition . . .”); see also Gonzales II, 515 F.3d 1097, 1115 (2008) (stating “Apprendi’s
holding is based upon ‘historical foundation,’ centuries of common law tradition regarding the role of the jury . . .”) (citation omitted).
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the accused at the trial for an alleged offense.”301 Indeed, as early as 2002,
the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that the application of
the Apprendi rule required the consideration of “whether the finding of a
particular fact was understood as within ‘the domain of the jury . . . by
those who framed the Bill of Rights.’”302 Because the historical practice
and role of the jury components were part of the Apprendi analysis from
its inception, the New Mexico Supreme Court may have misconstrued the
state of the Apprendi rule after Ice.
Assuming that Ice was intended to change the state of the Apprendi
rule, Rudy B. may still be distinguishable from Ice in two respects. First,
Ice dealt with multiple offenses, and Rudy B. dealt with a discrete offense. Second, the verdict alone subjected the defendant in Ice to the
maximum sentence for each of his multiple sentences. The trial court
judge in Ice merely decided the manner in which each individual sentence
would be served, not the length of the sentence. In Rudy B., the trial
court judge had to make additional findings to sentence Rudy as an
adult—findings that directly affected the length of his sentence.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Ice began its analysis by distinguishing
the case from the previous line of Apprendi cases because Ice involved
sentencing for multiple offenses, rather than a discrete offense.303 The dissent in Rudy B. pointed out that whether the sentence was for a discrete
offense was the threshold inquiry.304 Ice dealt with “multiple offenses different in character or committed at different times,”305 and the U.S. Supreme Court was thus unable to apply the previous line of Apprendi
cases.306 Rudy B. dealt with a discrete offense, and if the holding in Ice
was meant to apply only to multiple offenses, then the decision in Rudy
B. would likely have been decided differently because the Apprendi rule
would have been applied to amenability determinations based on the jurisprudence until Cunningham. The New Mexico Supreme Court even acknowledged that the cases before Ice, specifically until Cunningham,
supported applying the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations.307
Ice explained that the core concerns that prompted the decision in
Apprendi—encroachment by the judge upon facts traditionally found by
the jury and interference with the jury’s domain as bulwark between the

301. Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168 (2009) (emphasis added).
302. Id. (quoting Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002)).
303. Id. at 167.
304. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 75, 234 P.3d at 744 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
305. Ice, 555 U.S. at 167.
306. See id. (summarizing Apprendi and its progeny and concluding that Ice was
distinguishable because the Apprendi line of cases dealt with discrete crimes).
307. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 24, 234 P.3d at 732 (majority opinion).
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state and the accused—were not present regarding the imposition of multiple sentences.308 There was no “legislative attempt to remove from the
province of the jury the determination of facts that warrant punishment
for a specific statutory offense[,]” and therefore, the restriction on judgefound facts was inapplicable in Ice.309
The concerns that prompted the decision in Apprendi are present
with amenability determinations in New Mexico. Rudy was adjudicated
as a youthful offender for the statutory offenses of shooting from a motor
vehicle resulting in great bodily injury and aggravated battery with a
deadly weapon.310 Based only upon the facts of the verdict, the statutory
maximum sentence he could have received was commitment in a juvenile
facility until he reached the age of twenty-one.311 He was eligible for an
adult sentence only after the finding of additional facts by the trial court
judge. This is distinguishable from the defendant in Ice. There, the defendant was convicted of six different offenses stemming from two separate
incidents.312 Because there were two separate incidents, the trial court had
to decide whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences—the
manner of sentencing—but the facts required for the imposition of each
individual sentence were found based on the guilty verdict.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Ice explained that the state would be
within its authority to make consecutive sentences the rule and concurrent sentences the exception without the need to address the constitutional issue.313 As mentioned by the New Mexico Supreme Court, this
same reasoning could apply to the decision to sentence a child as a juvenile or as an adult.314 But if New Mexico made it the rule that all youthful
offenders would be sentenced as adults and only in exceptional cases
would youthful offenders be sentenced as juveniles, then youthful offenders would be entitled to all of the constitutional protections provided to
adults—including the Apprendi rule.
Despite the dissimilar facts in Ice and Rudy B., the New Mexico
Supreme Court used the Ice analysis after concluding that Rudy B. would
be an extension of the Apprendi rule for three reasons: amenability determinations are not offense specific, the findings are predictive in nature,

308. Ice, 555 U.S. at 169.
309. Id. at 170 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added).
310. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 4, 234 P.3d at 727.
311. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-19(B) (2009).
312. Ice, 555 U.S. at 165.
313. Id. at 171.
314. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 57, 234 P.3d at 740.
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and the findings are made in the juvenile justice context.315 Ice was distinguishable from the previous line of Apprendi cases because it was outside
the scope of the offense-specific context,316 and the New Mexico Supreme
Court concluded that amenability determinations were collateral decisions outside the scope of the offense-specific context and unrelated to
the charged offenses.317 The New Mexico Supreme Court in Rudy B. further stated that the amenability determination is not offense specific,318
even though the details of the offense “may have some bearing on th[e]
decision.”319
While an amenability determination on its face has little to do with
the offense because of its focus on the child, this notion is not very compelling because the trial court judge is required to consider offense-specific characteristics when making an amenability determination.320
Specifically, the first four factors that the judge must consider when making the amenability determination are offense specific:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense;
(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner;
(3) whether a firearm was used to commit the alleged offense;
[and]
(4) whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted.321

The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that the Apprendi rule
“continues to apply with full force to judicial findings enlarging criminal
sentences that conflict with the traditional domain of the jury[,]”322 but it
declined to hold that amenability determinations are under the scope of
Apprendi even though the first four factors required for amenability determinations are indeed within the traditional domain of the jury. After
concluding that amenability determinations are not offense specific, but
at the same time recognizing that offense-specific factors are part of amenability determinations, the New Mexico Supreme Court directed that

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. ¶ 40, 234 P.3d at 735.
Ice, 555 U.S. at 163.
Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 24, 234 P.3d at 732.
Id. ¶ 34, 234 P.3d at 734.
Id. ¶ 35, 234 P.3d at 734.
See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(C) (2009).
NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(C)(1)–(4).
Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 33, 234 P.3d at 734.
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three of the four offense-specific factors must indeed be submitted to the
jury.323
The second reason that the New Mexico Supreme Court provided
for its conclusion that applying the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations would be an extension of the rule was that the findings are predictive in nature. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the analysis
of the Tenth Circuit in Gonzales when it reasoned that the findings required by NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-20 (2009) are different from the
findings considered in the Apprendi line of cases because the Apprendi
rule had generally been applied to historical findings, rather than forward-looking determinations.324 The supreme court made this distinction
but acknowledged that the predictive versus historical analysis was not
relevant in Ice.325 Such a distinction was not relevant in Ice, nor was it set
forth in Apprendi.326 Apprendi is clear that “[l]abels do not afford an acceptable answer . . . the relevant inquiry is not one of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”327 The U.S.
Supreme Court has also stated that “all facts essential to imposition of
the level of punishment that the defendant receives—whether the statute
calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must
be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”328 The New Mexico
Supreme Court ignored the principle that “[i]f a State makes an increase
in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a
fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a

323. Id. ¶ 36, 234 P.3d at 735. The supreme court recommended that factors two
through four of Section 32A-2-20(C) should be submitted to the jury using special
interrogatories. It is unclear why the first factor, the seriousness of the alleged offense, was excluded from this recommendation because it is also offense-specific.
324. Id. ¶ 37, 234 P.3d at 735. The supreme court relied on Gonzales v. Tafoya
(Gonzales II), 515 F.3d 1097 (2008), for these assertions; however, the Tenth Circuit
in Gonzales II acknowledged that it was applying the law as it existed before United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), because the rules of those cases were not to be
applied retrospectively. Gonzales II, 515 F.3d at 1113.
325. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 38, 234 P.3d at 735.
326. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (adopting the rule that with
the exception of a prior conviction, “[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove
from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
327. Id. at 494 (alteration in original).
328. Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”329 The predictive versus historical analysis of the findings then is misplaced.
Cunningham330 is perhaps the most analogous case that provides guidance in this area. The Tenth Circuit on habeas review in Gonzales did
not review Cunningham and stated that it was applying the law as of the
date Apprendi was decided.331 The New Mexico Supreme Court, on the
other hand, acknowledged that “[i]f the Supreme Court had stopped at
Cunningham, we would be hard-pressed to disagree with our Court of
Appeals that judge-made amenability determinations under 32A-2-20 violate the Apprendi rule.”332 In Cunningham, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that California’s determinate sentencing law (DSL) violated a defendant’s right to a jury trial because it placed sentence-elevating fact finding
within the province of the judge.333 The DSL provided a lower, middle,
and upper level of sentencing.334 The trial court was required to impose
the middle level term unless the judge found aggravating or mitigating
factors.335 The trial court was required to consider “the trial record[,] the
probation officer’s report[,]336 statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the parties, the victim, or the victim’s family[,] and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.”337 The judicial council then adopted sentencing rules that provided a non-exhaustive list of
aggravating circumstances: facts relating to the crime, to the defendant,
statutorily declared aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and any
other criteria reasonably related to the decision being made.”338 The
judge was required to impose the middle-term sentence unless he found
facts either relating to the offense or the offender that were beyond the
elements of the crime.339 This is akin to the amenability determination
329. Id. at 602 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482–83).
330. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
331. Gonzales II, 515 F.3d 1097, 1110 (2008). The decision on habeas review therefore lacked the clarification provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in subsequent jurisprudence, perhaps most notably, the decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
(2004) (defining the statutory maximum), and Cunningham, 549 U.S. 270 (applying
Apprendi to so-called predictive findings relating to the offender).
332. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 24, 234 P.3d 726, 732, cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2098
(2011).
333. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 274.
334. Id. at 277.
335. Id.
336. Under NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-17 (2009), a comparable predisposition report
that concerns a youthful offender’s amenability to rehabilitative treatment must be
prepared at least five days before disposition or sentencing.
337. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted).
338. Id. at 278–79 (emphasis added).
339. Id. at 279.
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where the judge is required to impose a juvenile disposition unless he or
she finds facts either relating to the offense340 or the offender341 that are
beyond the elements of the crime. Either the U.S. Supreme Court was
mistaken when it declared in Ice that it had never extended the Apprendi
rule beyond an offense-specific context, or the Court considered the factors outlined in Cunningham, which are strikingly similar to those required for amenability determinations, to be offense specific. In either
event, the similarities between California’s DSL and the findings required
for amenability determinations tend to support that applying the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations would be an application, but
not an extension, of the rule.
The dissent in Rudy B. identified this distinction: “[w]hen a judge,
and not a jury, finds additional facts ‘related to the offense or the offender-beyond the elements of the charged offense’ as a prerequisite for
exercising discretion to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, such a scheme is unconstitutional.”342 “[A]n amenability hearing is
nothing more than a hearing on aggravating circumstances relating to either the offense or the offender.”343 The circumstances required to increase the penalty in Rudy B. were related to both the offense and the
offender. It is clear that a child is entitled to a jury finding beyond a
reasonable doubt for the circumstances relating to the offense, but it
would appear from Cunningham that a child is also entitled to a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt for the circumstances relating to the
offender.
Finally, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that applying
the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations would be an extension
of the rule because the findings are made in the juvenile justice context,
and the Apprendi rule had only been applied in the adult criminal context. Although states traditionally have greater latitude in establishing
their juvenile justice systems,344 New Mexico has chosen to provide
juveniles with a right to a jury trial.345 Therefore, the distinction between
the adult and juvenile contexts is perhaps immaterial. The New Mexico
Supreme Court even accepted the threshold inquiry that the Apprendi
rule could potentially apply in the juvenile context because youthful offenders in New Mexico are entitled to a jury trial when an adult charged

340. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(1)–(4) (2009); see also supra Part II.B.
341. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(5)–(7); see also supra Part II.B.
342. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 65, 234 P.3d 726, 741 (Chavez, J., dissenting) (citing Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 279).
343. Id. ¶ 81, 234 P.3d at 745.
344. Id. ¶ 39, 234 P.3d at 735 (majority opinion).
345. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-16 (2009).
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with the same offense would be entitled to one.346 Additionally, the Apprendi rule may apply because a juvenile is at risk of receiving an adult
sentence.347
In conclusion, it is debatable whether the historical practice consideration examined in Ice even adds anything new to the Apprendi rule
because the historical role of the jury has always been a consideration
when applying the rule. Second, the facts in Ice might be too distinguishable from the facts in Rudy B. to appropriately apply it to amenability
determinations. Indeed, it would appear that Cunningham is a closer fit
to amenability determinations. Finally, applying the Apprendi rule to
amenability decisions might not be an extension of the rule at all, in
which case the Ice analysis may be inapplicable.
D. The Importance of the Jury System and How it Extends to Juvenile
Proceedings
English colonists brought the jury trial right to America, and the
Founders acknowledged how important the right was by recognizing it in
the Bill of Rights.348 The right to a jury trial in a criminal case has long
been deemed a fundamental right, but the U.S. Supreme Court in McKeiver held that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial for adjudicative
proceedings,349 a decision that was largely based on the fact that juvenile
proceedings focus on rehabilitation, rather than criminal prosecution.350
However, if McKeiver were decided regarding youthful offender proceedings in New Mexico, the result would likely have been different. The
juveniles in McKeiver were exposed only to commitment until the age of
twenty-one,351 unlike youthful offenders in New Mexico, who can potentially be imprisoned for life in an adult penitentiary.352
The New Mexico Supreme Court relied on the distinction of adjudications used in McKeiver when it explained that the amenability determination is “an essential step in the adjudication and disposition of
children,”353 but the term adjudication in this context should be reserved
346. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 41, 234 P.3d at 736.
347. Rudy I, 2009-NMCA-104, ¶ 65, 216 P.3d 810, 826 (Sutin, J., specially concurring); see also N.M. CONST. art. II, §§ 12, 18; Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 723, 437
P.2d 716, 722 (1968).
348. Tina Chen, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial: Why is it a Fundamental Right For Adults and Not Juveniles?, 28 J. JUV. L. 1, 5 (2007).
349. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
350. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 78, 234 P.3d 726, 744 (Chavez, J., dissenting); see
also supra Part II.A.
351. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 78, 234 P.3d at 744 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
352. Id. ¶ 62, 234 P.3d at 740.
353. Id. ¶ 56, 234 P.3d at 739 (majority opinion).
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for juvenile sentences. In New Mexico, the amenability decision removes
the sentence from the realm of adjudications, and it then becomes a conviction that carries the stigma meant to be avoided by the enactment of a
separate juvenile system. Juvenile court proceedings are intended to be
informal, protective proceedings354 that are focused on rehabilitation.355
Such proceedings are not deemed to be criminal prosecutions under the
Sixth Amendment.356 Juvenile proceedings are fundamentally different
from adult criminal trials because of states’ interests in preserving and
promoting the welfare of children.357 But when a child in New Mexico is
subject to life imprisonment without the findings of a jury, the system is
no longer informal and protective, and it fails to promote the welfare of
the child.
Most jurisdictions have held that the Apprendi rule does not apply
to waiver proceedings.358 “In general, these courts have held that the rule
does not apply to a juvenile waiver proceeding because it is not a sentencing proceeding, but rather a determination of the court’s jurisdiction.”359
Other reasons employed by the courts in refusing to apply the Apprendi
rule to waiver proceedings typically also included that the juvenile criminal justice system and the adult criminal justice system are different, focusing mainly on the lack of a jury trial guarantee in the juvenile system
and that the findings required during a waiver proceeding are different
from the findings traditionally made by juries.360
The reasons for not applying the Apprendi rule to waiver proceedings, which focus largely on a finding of amenability, however, are likely
inapplicable to comparable proceedings in New Mexico. In other jurisdictions, if the juvenile court waives jurisdiction over a child, he or she is
then afforded jury protections when sent into the adult system. But in
New Mexico, the amenability determination, which places a child in the
adult system, is accompanied by an automatic adult sentence without jury
protections. New Mexico does not have pretrial waiver proceedings that
establish jurisdiction, and at the time the decision is made to move a child
354. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
355. Id. at 547.
356. Id. at 541.
357. Chen, supra note 348, at 3.
358. Gonzales II, 515 F.3d 1097, 1111 (2008); see also Vannella, supra note 53, at
751. But see Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d 781, 789 (Mass. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. King, 834 N.E.2d 1175 (Mass. 2005)
(holding “any facts, including the requirements for youthful offender status, that
would increase the penalty for such juveniles must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”).
359. State v. Kalmakoff, 122 P.3d 224, 227 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
360. Gonzales II, 515 F.3d at 1111–12.

R
R
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into the adult system by sentencing him or her as an adult, the juvenile
court already has adjudicated the child as guilty of the charged offenses.361
Additionally, juveniles are both constitutionally and statutorily entitled to
a jury trial in New Mexico.362 However, even if juveniles did not have the
right to a jury trial in New Mexico, that fact “does not seem sufficient to
distinguish Apprendi when the findings at issue authorize an adult sentence.”363 Finally, the argument that the findings required in waiver proceedings are different from those found by juries is not applicable in New
Mexico because an amenability determination acts as a sentencing enhancement, which must be found by a jury,364 and Cunningham foreclosed
the idea that circumstances relating to the offender are outside of the
jury’s province.365
The statutory system that has been enacted to provide juveniles with
greater protections is actually providing juveniles with fewer protections
in New Mexico. If Rudy had been tried and sentenced in the adult system, he would have been entitled to a jury finding of any fact, other than
a prior conviction, that increased his penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. The Apprendi rule has not been required in waiver proceedings because a juvenile is typically being moved into a system with
the protections of a jury where the maximum sentence received will be
subject to the rule,366 but in New Mexico, when a child is moved into the
adult system, a judge has discretion and often does sentence a child far
beyond the statutory maximum.367 The New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that the amenability determination is a statutory protection
that is meant to “temper the harshness of historical practice” and to pre361. Id. at 1112–13; see also NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-20(B) (2009) (stating that the
child must be adjudicated as a youthful offender before making the findings required
to sentence him or her as an adult).
362. Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 723, 437 P.2d 716, 722 (1968) (recognizing that a
jury trial is required under N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14); NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-16 (2009).
363. Gonzales II, 515 F.3d at 1113 (emphasis in original).
364. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000) (stating that a sentencing enhancement describes an increase beyond the statutory maximum and is the
functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense and must be covered by the
jury’s guilty verdict).
365. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 277–79 (2007) (applying Apprendi to California’s determinate sentencing law, which required consideration of
facts relating to the offense and the offender); see also supra Part IV.C.
366. “Once transferred, the juvenile will be subjected to the statutory maximum
sentence under the applicable criminal statute only after a jury has determined his or
her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Vannella, supra note 53, at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted).
367. Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 24, 234 P.3d 726, 732, cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2098
(2011); see also supra Part III.D.

R
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vent children from being imprisoned with hardened criminals.368 But by
removing from the province of the jury the fact finding necessary to increase a child’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum, children in New
Mexico are being provided fewer protections than those to which their
adult counterparts are entitled.
As the dissent noted in Rudy B., it is alarming that a child could be
sent to adult prison for life without the same protections that adults
have.369 Indeed, once the state has exercised its discretion to seek adult
punishment, the state’s focus is no longer on rehabilitation of the child,
but it then seeks to punish the child like it would an adult.370 Because
juveniles have a right to a jury trial in New Mexico, they should benefit
from all of the traditional functions of the jury.371
The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that amenability determinations are not proper for a jury finding because of the specialized
knowledge required372 and because it would require bifurcated proceedings adding delay and cost to the current system.373 “The Sixth Amendment jury trial right, however, does not turn on the relative rationality,
fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders.”374 Additionally, just as in
Ring v. Arizona where the “superiority of judicial factfinding in capital
cases [was] far from evident,”375 there is no support for the conclusion
that judicial fact finding in amenability determinations is superior. Judgemade amenability determinations require that “[t]he facts that determine
the length of the sentence to which [a youthful offender] is exposed will
be determined to exist . . . by a single employee of the State.”376 Faith in a
trial court judge is irrelevant because the child may believe that a jury is
more reliable and less idiosyncratic than a single judge.377 Furthermore,
the argument that entrusting fact finding to a judge in the interests of
fairness and efficiency has already been foreclosed:
The founders of the American Republic were not prepared to
leave it to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Id. ¶ 52, 234 P.3d at 739.
Id. ¶ 62, 234 P.3d at 740 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 70, 234 P.3d at 743.
Id. ¶ 78, 234 P.3d at 744 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 38, 234 P.3d at 735 (majority opinion).
Id. ¶ 58, 234 P.3d at 740.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607 (2002).
Id.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Rudy II, 2010-NMSC-045, ¶ 85, 234 P.3d at 746 (Chavez, J., dissenting).
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of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has
never been efficient; but it has always been free.378

Other states too have had to adopt new procedures after Apprendi.
New Mexico could take an approach similar to the states that have chosen to retain determinate sentencing after Apprendi by submitting the
facts necessary for imposition of an elevated sentence either immediately
after trial or at a separate hearing.379
Although the amenability hearing must be separate from the trial,380
the amenability hearing could be held immediately after a finding of guilt
while the jury is still convened. The predisposition report concerning
amenability required by NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-17 (2009) could be
prepared and submitted to the parties five days before trial. If the jury
renders a guilty verdict, a separate amenability hearing could be held immediately after the trial in order for that same jury to make its amenability determination. Following that decision, the subsequent predisposition
report required by statute could be ordered and the matter set for a separate sentencing hearing.381 Any additional burden imposed by this process
would be minimal, and indeed the protection of constitutional rights outweighs efficiency and reduction of costs in the judicial process.
An alternative way to resolve the tension between protecting the
constitutional rights as explained in Apprendi and the logistical hurdles of
applying the Apprendi rule to amenability determinations is to make the
amenability determination at a pretrial waiver proceeding. Indeed, New
Mexico previously followed the approach used by most other states by
making the amenability determination before trial until the modern version of the Children’s Code was enacted in 1993.382 The California legislature amended its determinate sentencing law following Cunningham383 in
order to save the constitutionality of the statute, and the New Mexico
legislature could amend the Delinquency Act to achieve the same result.
378. Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
379. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294 (2007) (explaining how several states have modified their systems after Apprendi and Blakely).
380. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-16(A) (2009) (requiring hearings on petitions to be
conducted separate from other proceedings); see also State v. Jones, 2010-NMSC-012,
¶ 13, 229 P.3d 474, 477 (stating that amenability hearings are special proceedings held
after adjudication).
381. See NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-17 (2009) (requiring that the adult probation and
parole division of the corrections department or the Children, Youth, and Families
Department prepare a subsequent predisposition report on a child after the amenability determination).
382. See supra Part II.B.
383. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (Deering 2011).
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By amending the Delinquency Act to once again provide for pretrial
amenability determinations, the original goals envisioned by creating a
separate juvenile system would be preserved for children who are not
prosecuted in the adult system. Children in the juvenile system would
avoid being imprisoned with hardened adult criminals, they would avoid
the stigma of criminal convictions, and the system could focus on the underlying goal of rehabilitation. The informal system that allows for
greater privacy and confidentiality, thereby reducing stigma and increasing the opportunity for rehabilitation, would be available for children
found to be amenable to rehabilitative treatment.
Pretrial amenability determinations would be outside the realm of
Apprendi because they would have no direct effect on sentencing. The
concern of the New Mexico Supreme Court that submitting amenability
determinations to a jury would cause undue cost and delay would be
abated. Additionally, the preference for judge-made amenability determinations because of the required specialized knowledge and the required
balancing of the factors provided in Section 32A-2-20 would be constitutionally sound if the amenability determinations happened in pretrial
waiver proceedings.
The jury trial right has been a fundamental right since the founding
of this country. Apprendi has added an additional element to this right
intended to be a bright-line rule: “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.”384 A child found to be not amenable to rehabilitative
treatment can be, and often is, automatically imprisoned in an adult penitentiary for a term far beyond the statutory maximum. Accordingly, amenability determinations in New Mexico should be within the province of
the jury or amenability determinations should made before trial like they
are in most other jurisdictions.
V. CONCLUSION
The Apprendi rule should be applied to amenability determinations
in New Mexico as the Delinquency Act is currently written because the
determination is made after a finding of guilt and the determination increases a youthful offender’s sentence far beyond the statutory maximum. In New Mexico, juveniles have a constitutional and statutory right
to a jury trial, and the application of the Apprendi rule logically follows.
Amenability determinations in New Mexico act like sentencing enhance-

384. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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ments and are not like their waiver counterparts in most other jurisdictions. The factors of NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-20 (2009) are strikingly
similar to the determinate sentencing law factors that have been held
within the realm of Apprendi. Finally, the importance of the jury’s role in
the criminal justice system demands applying the Apprendi rule before
taking away a child’s personal liberty.
Unfortunately, because New Mexico’s approach to post-trial amenability determinations is unique, the matter will likely never be accepted
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has denied
certification of Rudy B. Additionally, although the matter has been addressed on habeas review, the state of the law was reviewed as it existed
in 2000, without the benefit of later U.S. Supreme Court interpretations
of the application of the Apprendi rule. Accordingly, the best option to
resolve this error is to seek an internal resolution from the New Mexico
Legislature or the New Mexico Supreme Court. The New Mexico Legislature should be urged to change the law regarding amenability determinations to provide for pretrial determinations, or the New Mexico Supreme
Court should be urged to reconsider its position and provide jury protections for amenability determinations that subject children to the risk of
adult imprisonment, thereby providing children with at least the same
protections that are provided to adults in the criminal justice system.

